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Abstract 
One of the most discussed events of 2013 was the conflict in Mali, 
followed by the French military intervention against the Islamist’s radicals. 
After the successful French-Malian joint operation, the European Union began 
a training mission in Mali, tasked with restructuring and reconstructing the 
poorly trained and equipped Malian military. In this article, I’ll share the 
experiences of the Hungarian officers and NCO’s in EUTM Mali.  
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It became obvious by the beginning of 2013 that – while Hungary has 
regarded its participation in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans as 
its main priority – an increased presence in the African operations of the EU will 
be necessary. When the need for the establishment of an EU training mission in 
Mali arose, the Hungarian leadership indicated its willingness to provide at least 
5-10 military instructors for the mission. The final numbers were determined at 
the informal meeting of the EU ministers of defence in Dublin, on 12-13 
February 2013. 
 
By then it was decided that a liaison officer, a 3-man medical team and 6 
sniper instructors will be sent to Mali.1 Not all of the soldiers designated to be 
instructors were snipers, most of them lacked experience in military instruction, 
and their overall language skills were not perfect, either. As it turned out later, 
the soldiers of other countries also had a meagre knowledge of French, so the 
1 Of the 10-man Hungarian contingent, the liaison officer started his service at the mission headquarters already 
in March 2013, the 3-man medical team followed on 18 March, while the 6 sniper instructors on 13 April. The 
Hungarian medical experts serve at the German field hospital, along with German and Austrian experts. The 
members of the Hungarian sniper instructor group participated in the training of two Malian battalions, then their 
tasks were taken over by the Portuguese. 
 5 
                                                 
mission provided for a special French course (Besenyő 2013a, 74). The only 
problem was that the course was run by a high school teacher from Bamako, 
who spoke French perfectly, but could not speak English. Thus the course was 
less effective.2 The leadership of the mission has employed English-speaking 
French, Bambara and Tuareg interpreters to support the instructors, but this took 
double the time than in the case the instructors had actually spoken French. 
 
The marksmen travelled to Mali knowing only little about what 
circumstances would await them in the country, where would be their 
accommodation, their exact tasks, etc., so they had to improvise a lot in the first 
days. The Portuguese who replaced the Hungarians avoided this problem by 
sending a preparatory team one month before the replacement’s arrival, the 
members of which gathered any available information and also visited the 
Hungarian instructors in order to get information about the training activities. 
Thus, the arriving Portuguese group could begin almost instantly the overtaking 
of training activities from the Hungarian soldiers. 
 
At the end of the preparation, the instructors received their uniforms, 
medical and other equipment. During the operation it was realized that the 
breathability of the newer model of desert fatigue dress provided for them was 
not suitable for the Malian conditions, thus when they left the air-conditioned 
rooms, they started to sweat heavily. 
 
As it turned out, they did not need a lot of equipment – e.g. bedroll, 
chemical protection equipment, goretex jacket, polar sweaters, goretex gloves, 
etc. On the contrary, the inflatable raft could be utilised quite effectively during 
the marksmanship training. They did not have problems with the other 
equipment that provided adequate safety and comfort for the soldiers, and the 
2 As a researcher focusing on peacekeeping in Africa, I have indicated for years on several forums that it would 
be important to provide for French language courses – besides English – for those who are to be deployed on the 
African continent. Since the major part of conflict zones can be found on the territories of former French 
colonies, where the official language of the country remained that of the former colonizers. This is also true for 
Mali, where the populace belongs to more than 30 ethnic groups. During the training it became conspicuous that 
a significant part of the troops to be trained could communicate with both the members of other ethnic groups 
and the instructors only in French. Only a negligible amount of them speaks English. Not only the sniper 
instructors had problems with the French language in Mali: none of the medical team sent to Mali spoke French, 
while they could communicate in English, German and Danish. There were opinions that since they served in the 
German field hospital, they did not need to speak French. However, this is hardly maintainable in the case of a 
mission where more than 50 percent of the participants used French as its native language, and most of the 
soldiers in training also speak this language. 
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clothing also met the requirements.3 The IFAK medical kit4 issued to them 
proved to be extraordinarily useful. Besides this, they brought substantial 
supplies of several types of medicine, like Lariam, used against malaria. 
Lieutenant Zámbori was relentless; he demanded that everyone took the anti-
malaria medicine on time. Thus, there was no malaria infection amongst the 
Hungarians, even though almost every one of them got hit time by time by viral 
diarrhoea. 
 
In the end, the members of the Hungarian sniper instructor team travelled 
to Mali on 13 April 2013, and arrived already at about 20,00 hrs to Bamako, 
being greeted by the Hungarian ranking officer. The next day they received their 
briefing about the workings of the mission and the different rules and 
regulations at the mission headquarters; then travelled to Koulikoro Training 
Camp (KTC), located northeast from the Malian capital. After their arrival, they 
were shown around the camp, and then attended various military, professional 
and medical trainings for days. 
 
The supplying of the instructors was provided by the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) with the inclusion of international and local sub-contractors, 
from the financial framework of ATHENA. It included sustenance, provision of 
drinking water, cleaning, and later also the operation of the canteen, also with 
the inclusion of different sub-contractors.5 It was recognized by the health 
service that they could not provide meals of adequate nutritional value and 
vitamin content at all times, due to the limited local possibilities of procurement. 
The alimentation could not be improved initially, as in the camp there was no 
shop or store other than the kitchen, where the soldiers could have bought food. 
The provision of drinking water was unlimited and continuous. There is a spring 
in Mali, the water of which is a European-quality mineral water that is bottled 
by the locals under the name Diago. The water was also tested by the German 
3 As it is more and more probable that Hungarian soldiers will participate in more African operations, it would 
be worthwhile to look up the missionary developments of the 1990s, as the Hungarian soldiers who served in 
Angola, Rwanda and Mozambique have mentioned on several occasions that they received such experimental 
clothes that were exceptionally suitable for tropical work. Possibly, it would also be worthwhile to continue 
exchanging peacekeeping experiences with the French and Austrians, started a few years ago, including the issue 
of the appropriate uniform. Read more about the experiences gained during earlier African operations at Besenyő 
(2013b). 
4 The personal first aid kit provided to the Hungarians (IFAK – Individual First Aid Kit) is also used in the 
American forces. 
5 Regardless, there are nations – like the Germans – who created their own national supply group, thus they are 
capable of operating independently from the mission’s supply system in many areas. 
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lab, and approved for consumption6. The bottled water was also checked 
continuously, as the locals tended to collect the discarded empty bottles, wash 
them, and fill them with tap water, which led to different infections among the 
European soldiers. The Hungarian soldiers prevented this by cutting up the 
empty bottles, evading such risks. Besides this, the mission has provided bottled 
drinking water indefinitely at the distribution point in the training center that 
was open in the morning and the evening for a one-hour period. The medical 
service – due to the German field hospital7 – operated among far better 
circumstances, but luckily, other than frequent intestinal infections, diarrhoea, a 
dental issue and an insect bite, the Hungarian soldiers did not confront serious 
medical issues. 
 
While the instructors received laptops from the Hungarian Defence 
Forces, it was realized only in Mali that – due to security reasons – internet 
access was restricted by the French, thus the laptops could be used only 
limitedly. In the camp, the more than 500 instructors could use only two 
computers with internet access. The computer use was monitored, of course,8 
thus when the commander of the instructor group has reported in an e-mail to 
the Hungarian liaison officer in Bamako that the members of the “Waraba” 
battalion were rioting, he was warned not to do so in the future. Thus, when he 
had something of importance to report, he rather reported via phone. While the 
Hungarian soldiers conducted quite an intensive activity during the training, 
they managed to get to Bamako a few times, where they could regenerate. There 
were not a lot of such opportunities in the camp, as there were no internet cafés, 
gyms, or canteens then. The importance of stress handling and relaxation was 
recognised only by the end of the mission, when they strived to organise 
smaller-larger events for the instructors, where they could disengage from the 
daily hustle. 
 
It is important to know in order to understand the workings of the mission 
that, while the command of the mission was in Bamako, they did not intervene 
in the professional work at the training camp. Those serving at the command 
were the ones who communicated with the Malian government, the United 
6 For details see: University of Utrecht, 2006. 
7 A Role II-level institute. 
8 Besides this, the use of pendrives was also limited, only data carriers provided and approved by the mission 
could be used. Thus the soldiers were forced to write their mails on the computer themself, these contained only 
the most necessary informations due to the introduced time limitations. 
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Nations, the commander of “Operation Serval”9, and other governmental and 
non-governmental organizations. The commander in Koulikoro was a colonel, 
responsible for the operation of the training camp, and the activities of those 
serving there. The actual work was conducted by his deputies though, as he had 
to participate at political-military talks, and welcome delegations and visitors. 
One of his two lieutenant-colonel ranked deputies was an Irish officer operating 
the camp, responsible for the defense and supplying of the camp and the work of 
the interpreters and other auxiliary personnel. The other deputy, a French 
lieutenant-colonel, was responsible solely for training duties. Thus, if the 
commander of the Hungarian instructor group had any questions, he did not wait 
for the commander’s briefing, but could directly turn to the lieutenant-colonel 
responsible for training. 
 
It must be known about the training that the leaders of the European 
Union have undertaken that they would prepare 4 combined arms tactical 
groups10, designated by the Malian army, in 10-week intervals11 during their 15-
month mandate (Besenyő 2013d, 27). The Hungarian team conducted its actual 
instructing activity between the 4th and the 7th training week, when the elements 
receiving special training (engineering, TACP, INTEL, BTR, sniper) were 
separated from the companies. Since the Hungarian soldiers arrived in the 2nd 
training week of the first battalion, they had the opportunity to observe the end 
of the initial training, as well as participate as a counterforce in the forging of 
the battalion after the 4 weeks of their own training. Their task was to have the 
taught knowledge applied both by the snipers and the company commanders. 
This was necessary since the knowledge of the commanding personnel was 
meagre, thus every special instructor group also had to occupy itself with the 
theoretical training of the commanders (Binnie 2013). 
 
The EUTM Mali mission, starting on 18 February 2013, included 200 
instructors, a 150-man logistical, medical and administrative group and another 
150-man group tasked with force protection (Besenyő 2013a, 70). The European 
9 See more about „Operation Serval” at Besenyő (2013c). 
10 Combined Tactical Arms Groups (GTIA): a group means in this case an extended-number battalion. 
11 In one of my earlier articles (Besenyő 2013a), I mentioned that I find this time period insufficient for the 
training of a battalion, since it generally requires 27 weeks. The main problem is not presented by the individual 
abilities of the soldiers, but by the issue whether they would be able to operate as a coherent, cooperating group 
after a 10-week training, to consolidate the authority of the government in the northern territories, as well as 
winning the hearts and minds of the often hostile civilian (Arab and Tuareg) population. Since, if this does not 
work and there are no radical changes in Mali, then the leadership of the country can expect another Tuareg 
rebellion. 
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instructing personnel consists currently of 565 persons (Duijn 2013). So far, 
three battalions have finished their training, the preparation of the fourth will be 
ready by May 2014.12 The Hungarian instructors took part in the training of the 
“Waraba” and “Elou” battalions. In spite of the optimistic official reports, the 
prolongation of the mission’s mandate was mentioned several times, because the 
European instructors faced some unforeseen difficulties during the training, 
which in many cases influenced negatively the results of their work. 
 
Such a problem could be the attitude of Malian soldiers towards the issue 
of human rights, and their negative relations with the Tuareg and Arab populace 
in the northern territories. A good example is when the members of the 
“Waraba” battalion received tasks in the northern territories after the training, 
where they had to work together with the French soldiers assigned to them from 
“Operation Serval”.13 There, Islamist militiamen have attacked the soldiers of 
the battalion. They could not exploit the element of surprise though, and were 
pursued by the Malian soldiers. After the unsuccessful pursuit, the government 
soldiers have plundered a smaller settlement and a gas station on their way back 
to the barracks. While the case did not get much media attention, the hunt for a 
scapegoat started instantly, since there were so high expectations towards the 
first battalion trained by the EU. Sadly, the Europeans can hardly comprehend 
that while they taught the African soldiers for 10 weeks about Western practices, 
democracy and the observation of human rights (Delafortrie 2013), when they 
got into combat, they acted again according to the African practices that have 
been employed for several hundred years. These practices are inappropriate 
from the perspective of Western democratic notions. There was a similar case 
with the soldiers of the “Elou” battalion, at whom the civilians of a northern 
settlement threw rocks. When in response a soldier shot in the crowd, several 
civilians got injured. Besides these cases, there were several lesser encounters 
between the northern civilian populace and the Malian government forces, even 
though the media coverage of these events is limited. The report by the Spanish 
12 The Malian army currently consists of 8 battalions, their training, equipment and personnel is inadequate, as 
well as the abilities of the officers. The EU undertook the training of half of the Malian army (four battalions) in 
the framework of EUTM MALI. However, the equipping of the battalions advances only difficultly, this also 
hinders their training. Thus more and more European countries have offered the Malian army uniforms, firearms 
and other equipment. The experiences of the training of the first two battalions made it necessary to train the 
officers of the third and fourth battalion beforehand, since the professional knowledge and leadership 
experiences of the majority of Malian officers are abysmal. More information: http://www.eutmmali.eu/ 
13 This could be attributed to the fact that the European instructors cannot follow the Malian soldiers trained by 
them to the North in order to check how they apply the acquired knowledge in practice. Thus, follow-up is 
conducted by the French, who mentor the Malian units trained by the EU afterwards. 
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lieutenant-colonel serving in the Brussels group supporting the operation EUTM 
MALI also states that the soldiers deployed in the north still have to learn a lot 
about the upholding of human rights and the cooperation with civilian 
authorities and organisations (Barea 2013). A similar statement was made by the 
UN Secretary-General in his report S/2013/582 (UNSC 2013), as well as in the 
2013 November report of Amnesty International about Mali, where they 
specifically asked the decision-makers of the EU to put even greater emphasis at 
the trainings of EUTM MALI on the issue of human rights and make the Malian 
soldiers understand that the torture or ill-treatment of the civilian populace is 
forbidden (Amnesty International 2013).  
 
As mentioned before, the training could be begun by the Hungarians only 
on the second week after their arrival, when the ammunition and firearms 
required for the training arrived via the German air lift.14 By then it was also 
realized, though, that the Hungarian soldiers will not have to conduct sniper 
training, but scoped rifle training. As it turned out, a part of Malian soldiers did 
not have any kind of military expertise or combat experience, and without these, 
it is highly improbable to train professional snipers in the time of several weeks. 
The Hungarian instructors received only 4 weeks for the freshly invented scoped 
rifle module training, thus they had to design a totally new training plan, in 
accordance with the totally different conditions. According to the requirements 
of the Malian army, 27 soldiers per battalion – 9 per company, 3 per platoon, 1 
per squad – had to be trained. 
 
As the first step, the Hungarian instructors conducted maintenance on the 
weapons brought with them, and ranged them at the firing range of the base. 
Then they had the opportunity to meet with the personnel to train. It was 
realized within hours that the soldiers did not have military experience, they did 
not know the weapon types assigned to them; they could not read a map, make a 
field sketch, use a compass or determine the northern direction15. Thus the 
Hungarian instructors had to organise such a training that taught those basic 
skills to the Malian soldiers, which they should have already possessed by the 
beginning of the training. As the soldiers did not possess maps or compasses, 
these also had to be requisitioned by the Hungarians, then, after teaching the 
14 The firearms and the corresponding ammunition were provided by the Hungarian Defence Forces. 
15 Francois Ducrotté and Elena Marda (2013) made similar statements in the June 2013 volume of the European 
Security Review, referring to an EU instructor, but the targets of their criticism were not the aforementioned 
skills of the soldiers, but those of the officers. How could we expect the Malian soldiers to be able to read a map 
when neither can their officers? 
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basic skills, the practical, scoped-rifle training has started. Here, the instructors 
faced another problem. The firing range created at the training base was not 
ready on time, and was not built in the way as requested16. The instructors were 
also limited in the use of the firing range due to the busy schedule, thus they had 
to take this into account when combining the theoretical and practical courses, 
and balance it in order to have also time for field training exercises, orientation 
exercises, and night operations exercises (marching, area security, patrol, etc.). 
Due to the decision of the mission commander, both instructors and trainees had 
to spend one night a week in the open air, in order to practice night operations. 
The practical training consisted of compass use, urban operations, target 
reconnaissance, etc. At these exercises the groups were often divided, thus tasks 
were better allotted, and it was easier to attend to the Malian soldiers 
individually. For instance, Malian soldiers did not know their personal weapons 
so much, thus these were initially maintained by the Hungarian instructors, and 
afterwards was maintenance taught to the Malians. Despite this, until the end of 
the mission, firearms maintenance was conducted under the close watch of the 
instructors. This is was also necessary due to security reasons.17 At the end of 
the training module, the Hungarian soldiers have double-checked and 
maintained every weapon before placing them in the firearms cabinets. 
 
Other problems presented themselves, too. For example, the Hungarian 
instructors were not really satisfied with the marksmanship skills of the Malian 
soldiers, as they ranged the assault rifles to 25 metres instead of 100, according 
to French practice. In spite of this, they could not hit the targets even from this 
range. They started shooting from 100 metres, then they advanced to first 200, 
then 300 metres, but at that range there were almost no substantive hits. In the 
end, they became really effective at a 100-metre range. There were of course 
some – mostly Tuaregs – who were “natural” marksmen, and the training 
improved their skills, but this was not common. There were also problems with 
the discipline of the Malian soldiers, but the instructors attributed this to the 
16 The Hungarian instructors proposed the building of a 600-metre-long firing range, but in the end only a 300-
metre-long one was constructed. 
17 The Malian soldiers kept their weapons with them at all times, but the ammunition was locked away in the 
arms depot. In spite of this, when a company was inspected, more than 200 pieces of live ammunition were 
found at the soldiers. These, however, did not originate from the storage of the EUTM. Since the military was 
divided by many bloody conflicts in the past period, and not all are pleased about the EU presence in Mali, the 
command of the mission reacted strongly regarding this issue, too. The very idea is unbearable to think about 
what could have happened if any Malian soldier would have used his weapon against one of his peers or an 
instructor. Unfortunately, such cases happened frequently in Afghanistan, where the allied Afghan military and 
policing forces, trained by NATO troops, opened fire upon their Western colleagues. The possibility of this 
cannot be totally excluded in Mali, either.  
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differences in mentality between trainees and instructors. The uniforms of the 
Malian soldiers were quite mixed at the beginning of the training, but equipment 
and uniforms arrived continuously due to the various donors. The head of the 
Polish logistics group, a lieutenant-colonel, was constantly reporting to the 
commander about the arrival of new equipment. By the end, all Malian soldiers 
were in the possession of two replacements of brand new uniforms.18 However, 
in the case of weaponry, the situation was not satisfactory. Weapons also arrived 
to the mission but their quality was far from adequate. On one occasion, the 
head of training asked the Hungarian instructors to visit one of the Malian 
companies, where they would have had to range a few AK assault rifles. 
Lieutenant Zámbori did not undertake this task, however, because the material 
quality of the rifles and assault rifles was so low sometimes that it endangered 
the operator of the weapon. The quality of their ammunition was even worse. 
The lieutenant could recall only a few cases when the ammunition by the 
Hungarian Defence Forces misfired, compared to every fifth of the ammunition 
provided by the Malian military. Their ammunition cases were not even made of 
steel, but of copper. It was such a low-grade design that the cartridge case was 
sometimes damaged even by being dropped. 
 
During the training, the Hungarians could get to know better the Malian 
soldiers, their habits, culture, and differing mentality, which was not an easy 
task. The soldiers of the African militaries had a different attitude towards the 
more unpopular tasks than the Europeans: many soldiers were absent from the 
trainings. The Hungarians were lucky, since the soldiers assigned to the scoped 
rifle training were very motivated, thus the instructors had to face the absence of 
only a few soldiers. Similarly, they did not experience serious ethnic tensions 
among the trainees, either. There were only relatively few Tuareg soldiers 
serving in the “Waraba” battalion; their numbers were much higher in the 
“Elou” battalion.19 A significant part of them served formerly in the northern 
territories, they also possessed a certain level of battle experience. The oft-
mentioned tension between the different ethnic groups could not be observed 
here, they could work together well during the exercises. One of the greater 
problems for them was that, by the end of the training, their salary was reduced 
18 The Polish were not only assuming a role in counseling and training, but as a donor state they provided 
substantial material support for the Malian military. See Pietrzak, 2013. In spite of that, the equipment of the 
Malian army is lacking and inadequate, which, besides other factors, limits greatly the applicability of the 
military. 
19 In the first battalion, less than 4 percent of the personnel (30-40 persons), while in the second battalion about 
15 percent (150-160 persons) was the ratio of Tuareg soldiers.  
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as they did not receive their combat subsidies of about 100 USD, that everyone 
received who served more than 25 days in the northern territories (Thiénot 
2013). Still, the greatest issue was not this, but the non-existent sum that the 
participants of the training expected from the EU. The cause was that the United 
States formerly operated the “Pan Sahel Initiative” and then the Trans Sahara 
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) counter-terrorism programmes (Lecocq 
and Schrijver 2007, 143-145; Diarra 2012, 20) in cooperation with the Malian 
government, and trained special forces for the fight against the AQIM. During 
the training, the soldiers of the unit received extra salary and subsidies from the 
Americans.20 While nobody told that the EU would give any kind of extra 
allowances at the end of the training, some of the Malian soldiers in EUTM Mali 
still thought so. They completed the training in a disciplined way, and waited for 
the pay-day. After they did not receive the expected rewards, they rioted one day 
before the planned ending ceremony, because someone spread false news 
according to which the generals of the Malian army “stole” it. Regrettably, as 
corruption is so widespread in Mali, nobody questioned the trustworthiness of 
the statement. At first, they grumbled only among themselves, and then they 
gathered in their camp and demanded the “premium” louder and louder. Since 
the camp of the Malian soldiers was not in the training centre, at first only a few 
instructors – among them Hungarians – noticed the problem, and after the mass 
became less and less manageable, and their own battalion commander could not 
restore order, the then commander of the training centre, Colonel Christophe 
Paczka was summoned there. The soldiers told the colonel that they do not have 
any problems either with him or the instructors, but they demand the extra 
allowances for the training. As the colonel saw that he cannot pacify the rioting 
masses, he notified the deputy of the chief of general staff of the Malian 
military, who visited the training camp personally. In the end, it was him, who 
convinced the soldiers to return to their barracks. Due to this commotion, the 
ending ceremony was not held at the originally planned time, even though many 
guests were invited. Taking this into account, it is understandable why General 
Francois Lecointre, the commander of the mission has declared after the end of 
the training of the first battalion that “although their capabilities have improved, 
they still have room to enhance their discipline, cohesion and trust in the Army 
chain of command.” The general also stated that the reconstruction of the 
Malian military still requires a lot of time, since it could still collapse at any time 
(Barea 2013). 
20 During the lessons of policing forces, the EUPOL used a similar motivation in Afghanistan. 
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This problem was not present at the training of the second battalion, as it 
was made clear to the soldiers that they cannot expect any kind of reward or 
additional allowances during the period of the training. As the personnel of this 
battalion was selected more carefully – there were more soldiers who possessed 
preliminary military training and combat experience – there were less issues 
with them than with the personnel of the Waraba battalion.21 Of course, neither 
the “Elou” battalion could finish the training without issues. The joint final 
exercise of the battalion took place following the 10-week training, where it 
turned out that they did not receive sufficient sustenance. It turned out at this 
time that during the training period the Malian military provided so inadequate 
sustenance that it threatened the success of the training, but the soldiers did not 
complain. Then, when they returned to the camp after the battalion exercise, 
they did not get food, but they still did not complain. However, they got to know 
the next day that they would get 10 days of leave so that they could visit their 
families. It turned out then that the soldiers would not receive the subsistence 
allowance which they received during the training period, and the personnel 
started to grumble. Colonel Philippe Testart, then commander of the training 
centre, ordered instantly the distribution of 400 MREs to them, moreover, he 
purchased them a cow that they could slaughter for the ending ceremony. The 
colonel called the Malian general staff afterwards, and arranged that one of the 
generals would visit and speak with the soldiers, as well as arranged for the 
payment of 3 days of subsistence allowance to the Malian soldiers. A more 
serious uprising was prevented this way. 
 
According to the opinion of the Hungarian instructors, the first battalion 
was more motivated and had a far better attitude towards the training, but they 
were less trained than the personnel of the second battalion. Probably this is why 
21 The European instructors gained also other important experiences, as it presented a serious problem that the 
battlegroups, set up according to French standards, as well as the continuous planning and management tasks 
expected accomplished staff and commanders from the Malian army, even though it was lacking such 
capabilities. Exactly due to this, after the training of the first battalion – when the issue was recognized by the 
leadership of the mission – the specific training of the battalion staff and commanders appeared as a separate 
element. This however led to a new issue, as the commanders participating in the aforementioned training joined 
their own subdivisions only in the 4th and 5th week of the training, where the soldiers could hardly accept them. It 
caused problems at multiple times that the young, 20-30-year-old lieutenants and first lieutenants (platoon 
commanders, deputy company commanders, etc.), returning from the commander training and equipped with the 
knowledge acquired there, went about to lead the subdivisions confidently, but the personnel – while it executed 
their commands – did not recognize them as their commanders. Moreover, they presented constant problems 
(regular latencies, absencies, the loss of equipment, lack of concentration and attention, etc.) Thus the mission 
adjusted the training programme a little more. The training of commanders was not conducted during the 10-
week training period, but beforehand, in a 3-week period. Thus they could execute the tasks along with their 
subdivisions, after their preparation. This strengthened the cohesion of the units, moreover, the personnel 
respected more their officers who were better prepared than the usual Malian officers. 
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the training of the personnel of the second battalion went better, as they already 
had “military records”. The firing range was also completed by then, thus the 
trainees had far more opportunities for shooting. On the whole, the morale was 
good, the Malian soldiers were willing and enjoyed to participate in the training, 
and got along well with the European – including Hungarian – instructors, too.22 
So, the objective the Hungarian soldiers were tasked with was completed 
successfully. By the end of the mission, Lieutenant Zámbori prepared an 
English-language instruction material that included the experiences of the 
training of the first battalion, and which was rated so well by the French 
commander that the Portuguese replacing the Hungarians continued the training 
according to this material. 
 
The military leadership should elaborate more in detail on the experiences 
of the soldiers who served in Mali and incorporate them into the preparation of 
the personnel to be assigned to future African operations, focusing especially on 
the teaching of French and on the provision of proper equipment,23 as well as on 
the cultural differences and the current infectologic and hygienic challenges. It is 
important to organise the deployment of our soldiers to missions more 
carefully24, as well as the support of the families of those serving abroad on 
missions. 
 
We have to prepare for the African operations, as it seems that the EU 
wants to participate mostly not in peace enforcement, but in peacekeeping 
operations – mainly in the field of training and counseling – on the African 
continent, thus more and more Hungarian soldiers will have the opportunity to 
serve in African operations. 
22 The acceptance and respect of the Malian soldiers towards the European instructors was high. Despite this, a 
few instructors behaved especially arrogantly with the trainees. They were not willing to understand what 
differences the low level of education and the socialization differing from Western norms  could cause between 
the way of training of European and Malian soldiers. Based on my own experiences in Africa, I could definitely 
state that already due to the different cultural background, more patience and compassion should be shown 
towards African soldiers. In the case of adequate treatment, sustenance and training, they can perform equally 
well as any European soldiers. 
23 It is advised to take into consideration at the supplying of personnel the experiences and advices of those who 
served in earlier African operations. 
24 Even when it requires the deployment of a 2-3-man preparatory group, since these funds will offer returns by 
all means, if only even that the delegated Hungarian soldiers would face far less issues, thus they could dedicate 
all their time and energy to the execution of the objective they were deployed to complete. This includes that the 
mission personnel would know already before the deployment what is expected of them, and what conditions 
they would be facing – salary, sustenance, etc. 
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